Abstract: We construct a model in which oligopolistic firms decide where to locate. Firms choose to locate either in a country where employment protection implies costly output adjustments or in one without adjustment costs. Using a two-period three-stage game with uncertainty it is demonstrated that location is influenced by both flexibility and strategic concerns. We show that the strategic effects under Cournot work towards domestic anchorage in the country with adjustment costs while those under Bertrand do not. Strategic agglomeration can occur in the inflexible country under Cournot and even under Bertrand provided uncertainty and foreign direct investment costs are low.
Introduction
This paper contributes to the understanding of the complex interface between globalisation and labour standards by focussing on the effects of employment protection on the international location of economic activity.
The past decade has witnessed a remarkable acceleration of the process of integration of the world economy -often referred to as 'globalisation'. The liberalisation of foreign direct investment (FDI) policies worldwide, which has resulted in investment flows between countries growing much faster than trade flows, has led to an increase in the ease with which firms (and jobs) move across national borders. As a result, governments' rhetoric and policies increasingly betray concerns about their countries' ability to prevent domestic industry from relocating abroad and to attract and/or retain foreign investment.
Labour market institutions are commonly regarded as playing a crucial role in determining the location of economic activity, not least if they influence the flexibility with which firms can adjust output scale and employment levels to evolving economic conditions. Employment protection laws in particular are identified as a major source of inflexibility and, increasingly, recommendations are put forward that the statemandated redundancy payments -which were introduced in many European countries from the late 1950s to the early 1970s -are dismantled. The emerging consensus is that by forcing firms to under-produce during economic booms and over-produce when the economy slows down 1 , high hiring and firing costs undermine their ability to adapt to fast changing competitive markets. Not only is employment protection held responsible for the poor employment performance of many European countries (e.g. Lindbeck and Snower, 1988; and Lazear, 1990 ) but also for hindering countries' ability to hold on to footloose industries. It follows that, in a world where countries perceive themselves as being engaged in fierce competition for economic activity, the substantial differences that exist between economies (even within the European Union) in hiring and firing restrictions 2 are seen as a source of unfair 'competitive advantage' for those locations with lower costs of employment adjustments.
Whilst a substantial amount of work has been carried out to assess the impact of hiring and firing restrictions on employment 3 , to our knowledge (and despite its prominence in policy debates) the flexibility offered to firms by a given location in adjusting to changing economic conditions 4 has received relatively little attention in the theoretical literature on FDI 5 . Instead, the study of industry location has tended to focus on market access and local costs of production as the central determinants of a country's ability to attract FDI and retain domestic firms 6 . These factors are of course important. However, by focusing on the relationship between employment protection and the location of industry this paper fills an important gap in the literature. To explore this relationship, we combine ideas from the industrial organisation and the labour literature, and apply these to a set-up in which firms' locations are endogenous.
We argue that, contrary to the conventional wisdom, labour market inflexibility may not necessarily hinder a country's ability to attract and/or retain economic activity.
This view finds theoretical support in the theory of industrial organisation that emphasises how commitment (i.e. inflexibility) may be a source of strategic advantage (Tirole, 1988) . We shall therefore investigate how region-specific flexibility affects location decisions when firms are oligopolistic and act strategically.
In a non-strategic set-up, flexibility only entails advantages for a firm. This is not 2 According to Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991) , firing costs have ranged from 0.48 months salary in Denmark to 5.24 in France and even to 15.86 in Italy. 3 Hiring and firing restrictions are typically not found to have a decisive role on overall rates of unemployment (e.g. Nickell (1998) ). 4 Firm flexibility in terms of "locational portfolio diversification" has been examined in the literature. More specifically, the role of cost and exchange rate uncertainty in providing a rationale for setting up plants in different countries has been respectively studied in de Meza and Van der Ploeg (1987) and in Sung and Lapan (2000) . 5 Cooke (1997) finds evidence that host countries' restrictive legislation governing layoffs have had a negative effect on US foreign direct investment abroad. Moran (1998, p.89) summarises evidence from investor surveys and mentions labour regulations, in particular "flexibility in hiring and laying off workers", as one of the main concerns for firm location in economies of transition and developing economies. A cursory look at available data (UNCTAD, 2001), however, does not seem to support the conventional wisdom that employment protection is unambiguously inimical to inward FDI. Amongst the European countries with higher than average values of the employment protection index constructed by Nickell, Nunziata and Quintini (2001) , a significant number also show higher than average levels of inward FDI (e.g. Belgium, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden and Finland) -in general, no clear correlation emerges by comparing the data on shares of world FDI and employment protection levels. 6 See Smith (1987) , Markusen (1987) and (1992) . For a comprehensive survey on multinationals and FDI we refer to Caves (1996) .
necessarily true when firms act strategically, since flexibility then implies lack of commitment power. Firms producing in locations where employment is less flexible may therefore benefit from potential advantages obtained by the commitment power that such inflexibility implies 7 .
We use a two-period oligopoly model, in which firms' location decisions depend on strategic and flexibility considerations. Our analysis will be driven by two substantive questions. First, do location-specific sources of inflexibility create strategic advantages that affect a country's ability to retain production of internationally mobile firms? As we argued, while this question has remained largely unexplored in the theoretical literature 8 , policy makers often cite strict employment protection as a threat to the anchorage of domestic industry. Second, when can we expect to find strategic clustering in the same regions and when is strategic geographical dispersion more likely? By focussing on this question, this paper complements the economic geography literature, which is mainly concerned with agglomeration formation in non-strategic set-ups 9 .
The model is outlined in Section 2. The non-strategic determinants of location are analysed in Section 3, while the strategic implications of inflexibility are discussed in Section 4. Section 5 analyses the location decisions of firms and examines the effects of increasing globalisation on the strategic incentives to geographical agglomeration.
Section 6 concludes the paper.
The model
Two firms plan to launch new products, which are imperfect substitutes, to be sold in an integrated market. One firm, the Home firm, has its headquarters in the country named "Home", while the other, referred to as the Foreign firm, has its headquarters in the country named "Foreign". Each has to decide where to locate their production plant: either in "Home" or in "Foreign". We assume that the fixed costs of setting up a plant are sufficiently high to ensure that each firm chooses to have one plant only. 7 The effect of adjustment costs on strategic behaviour has been discussed in set-ups without location decisions (see Lapham and Ware, 1994; Jun and Vives, 2001) . 8 The strategic effects of production cost differences on location choice have received ample attention in the literature (see references in footnote 6). 9 See, for instance, Krugman (1991) and Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1999 As mentioned above, each firm has to choose either Home or Foreign as its production location. We assume that these countries differ in one important respect.
In Home, strict labour market regulations, inspired by a concern for employment protection, prevail. These cause firms to incur hiring and firing costs if, after an unexpected change in demand, they want to deviate from the period-one production 
10 Strictly speaking, the model could allow homogeneous products (e=1) with Cournot behaviour, but not with Bertrand behaviour. 11 We restrict the support ] , [ u u to guarantee interior solutions. 12 We assume that the discount factor is unity. actions are determined given demand for period one but with uncertainty about demand in period two. In period two, the uncertainty is resolved and firms choose market actions after having observed actual demand for that period (stage three).
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In this model, a firm's location decision is influenced both by non-strategic and strategic factors. The non-strategic aspects of the production location choice are examined first.
The non-strategic dimension of the location decision
To focus on the non-strategic location determinants, we initially abstract from strategic behaviour by considering the limit case of e=0 in which one firm's product is sufficiently different from its rival's that each firm effectively becomes a monopolist. In the absence of strategic behaviour, only cost and flexibility considerations will determine firms' location choices.
The location choice of a Foreign monopolist is simple: it will always choose to produce in Foreign since this choice entails maximum flexibility without incurring the cost of FDI. For a Home monopolist, the location decision involves a trade-off between the costs of FDI and the flexibility benefits associated with producing in
Foreign. Due to demand uncertainty, the firm anticipates it will face adjustment costs in Home, while there will be no adjustment costs when it produces in Foreign.
Note that there is a critical level of uncertainty above which the Home monopolist will choose to produce in Foreign and below which it will choose to locate in Home.
This critical 2
σ -level decreases in the degree of labour market inflexibility in Home (λ) and increases in the degree of international capital immobility ( δ ).
Strategic implications of employment protection
When products are substitutes, i.e. e>0, firms behave as duopolists and their location decisions involve both strategic and non-strategic considerations. Solving the game backwards, in this section we explore the strategic implications of employment protection at fixed locations (location choice is discussed in section 5). Since firms interact differently under Cournot and under Bertrand competition, we study the strategic implications of the production location in both forms of oligopoly. For expositional clarity, we explain the nature of the strategic effects in detail using the case in which each firm produces domestically, that is, the Home firm produces in
Home and the Foreign firm in Foreign (i.e., (H,F)). The strategic behaviour in the other possible location equilibria will be discussed at the end of each subsection, using table 1, which reports the strategic term in all possible location combinations.
Cournot competition
Firms' production locations affect their market actions. We first consider period two, in which locations and period-one outputs have already been chosen. 
Expressions (5a) and (5b) clearly suggest that a firm's location has implications for its flexibility. The Home firm's reaction function responds less to unexpected demand shocks than its rival's does (
from (5a) and (5b) 
Subscripted variables denote partial derivatives. In (6a) and (6b), the second term on the left-hand-side captures the strategic effects. The strategic term in (6a) Nesting the case with Bertrand competition in the model outlined in section two requires inverting the demand system given in expressions (1a)-(1b) and (2a)-(2b).
Thus, we obtain ) (
Like under Cournot, we first concentrate on the case in which each firm produces
the (H,F)-case).
Starting with the final stage of the game, the second-period price reaction functions are given by
for the Home and the Foreign firm respectively 17 . The Home firm's price reaction function responds more to unexpected demand shocks than its rival's does
from (8a) and (8b)). Since the firm in Home is less flexible in output, unexpected demand shocks will be translated in a larger price flexibility. For the same reason, the Home firm's optimal price is more responsive to changes in its rival's price (or, 2 / ) 2 /( ) 1 ( e e > + + βλ βλ ). The Home firm's past output level enters negatively in its second-period price reaction function. As output is sticky in the presence of adjustment costs, a higher output in period one is associated with a higher output in period two and therefore with a lower price. This has important implications for firms' price setting in period one, to which we now turn.
17 A firm that faces adjustment costs effectively faces upwards sloping marginal costs in period two. It is well known that increasing marginal cost may lead to problems with the existence of the Bertrand equilibrium (for discussion of non-existence of equilibria under price competition, see for instance Tirole (1988) > dp dp E p π , as shown in table 1), which implies that the firm in Home strategically over-prices in period one ( 0
As a result, in period-one demand for the Home firm's good and hence its output will be low. It follows that, due to its production inflexibility, in period two the Home firm will keep its output low and its price high (see expression (8a)).
Unlike in the Cournot case, the firm in Foreign also has an incentive to behave strategically. More specifically, that firm strategically under-prices (i.e., since
< dp dp E p π , as reported in strategically under-price in period one (see table 1): even though a concern for high future prices gives each firm an incentive to keep its first-period production low (by overpricing in period one), it creates an even greater incentive for firms to keep their rival's first-period production low (by underpricing in period one) 20 .
[ Table 1 about here]
Location patterns
We now turn to stage one, in which firms simultaneously choose their production location. Taking the rival's production location as given, each firm simply selects the location that yields the highest expected profits. To explain how firms' location choices are determined, it will prove useful to decompose expected maximised profits
In expression (10) the first term,
, denotes deterministic profits with
; θ is deterministic operating profit and Φ is the fixed costs incurred by the firm, which depends on whether the firm locates in its domestic economy ( Tirole (1988, p.325-326 In order to highlight the importance of δ in explaining the type of location pattern that emerges, we will distinguish between two different cases. First, we shall focus on a situation in which firms incur a significant cost of FDI (section 5.1). In that context there is a natural tendency for firms to locate domestically, thereby avoiding the high FDI-costs. We refer to the circumstances in which the Home firm produces in the In our analysis, we will also point out the effects of product differentiation (e) on location. From section 3 we know that Cournot and Bertrand competition both converge to the monopoly case at e=0. As e increases, the strategic effects become stronger and the two types of oligopolistic behaviour give rise to divergent location patterns. The figures are drawn for e=0.75, which brings out clearly the differences in location patterns between the two market structures. In contrast to the FDI-cost, the degree of product differentiation tends not to affect location patterns in a qualitatively significant way. We will briefly comment on the effects of e at the end of each subsection. Hence, we cover all the qualitatively different cases that arise with different parameter combinations.
Domestic anchorage
Suppose that the fixed costs associated with FDI are high enough for the Foreign firm never to choose to locate in the Home country. Then, any potential strategic advantage of locating in Home would be dominated by the FDI-costs and hence the firm will, even under certainty, produce in Foreign (as uncertainty rises, the attractiveness of the Foreign location increases). Given that the Foreign rival produces in Foreign, we then need to examine where the Home firm will set up its plant. As product differentiation increases (i.e. as e falls), strategic behaviour is diminished.
As a result, the area with domestic anchorage shrinks under Cournot competition 22 In the figures, the maximum value for λ is limited to ensure the existence of all possible equilibria. whereas it expands under Bertrand competition. Importantly, the area with domestic anchorage is always largest under Cournot behaviour.
Globalisation and strategic agglomeration
The process of globalisation implies that capital mobility increases. In our model this is captured by falling FDI-costs ( δ ) 
[Figures 5 and 6 about here]
The location effects of deepening globalisation prove to be relatively robust to changing degrees of product differentiation. It is worth mentioning that as product differentiation increases ( e falls), strategic agglomeration still occurs, but only at lower levels of uncertainty.
Conclusions
decisions when future demand is uncertain and firms act strategically. When demand uncertainty is very high, firms will cluster in countries where the labour market is relatively flexible, thus avoiding costly redundancy packages during economic slowdowns and expensive overtime payments or hiring costs in economic booms.
Among countries with a high degree of capital mobility, this location pattern may even prevail at relatively low levels of uncertainty.
However, when firms act strategically, they may be willing to forego flexibility and produce in countries where the labour market is relatively inflexible in order to obtain strategic advantages. This is the case when the firms engage in Cournot behaviour.
Under quantity competition an inflexible location allows a firm to commit to high future output, which makes the inflexible location more attractive at low levels of uncertainty. This strategic advantage helps to maintain domestic anchorage of firms in locations with strict labour regulations. Under price competition however, a firm located in the inflexible country faces aggressive pricing from its flexible rival in period one. As a result, the inflexible location is unfavourable both from a strategic and a flexibility perspective. Hence, both strategic and flexibility incentives work against domestic anchorage under Bertrand competition.
We have shown that deepening globalisation can lead to a greater tendency for the development of strategic agglomeration. This is the case under both Cournot and Bertrand competition. Under Cournot competition, firms facing low FDI-costs cluster in the inflexible location when uncertainty is low (this can also occur under Bertrand competition at very high levels of employment protection and when uncertainty is very low). Such clustering has however a prisoner's dilemma character with firms all producing higher output and enjoying less flexibility than they would in a location with lower labour adjustment costs. Under Bertrand competition, when strategic agglomeration occurs, it does so mainly in the flexible location as firms flee the strategically unfavourable inflexible location.
When formulating the policy lessons from this analysis, one should proceed with caution. Throughout this paper, we have assumed that the level of employment protection is exogenous. This is a reasonable assumption since the political unwillingness to change employment protection regulations, once these are in place, is often strong. It does not, however, preclude policy makers from using locationdependent fiscal incentives to increase the attractiveness of their region. Our analysis suggests that countries with strict labour regulations will find it less difficult to achieve domestic anchorage of key industries, by using fiscal incentives, when firm behaviour is approximated by Cournot rather than by Bertrand competition 24 .
Finally, we have not derived optimal employment protection levels in this paper. This would require taking into account the link that typically exists between employment protection and labour costs: employment protection tends to push up labour cost -not least because it strengthens workers' bargaining power -which would in turn affect a location's attractiveness for investors. Whether and how a government should design its labour standards optimally in order to achieve domestic anchorage and to maximise its FDI-inflow is a question left for future research. 24 Whether firms' behaviour is better described by Cournot or by Bertrand competition would need to be empirically investigated on an industry-by-industry basis. There exists a substantial empirical literature on this issue (for a textbook survey, see Martin (2002) , Ch.7). 
